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 The article analyzes the factors determining the capital structure of the Spanish small 
and medium enterprises [SMEs]. The analysis is grounded on the agency theory, the 
signalling approach and the pecking order theory. In particular, the article provides a 
qualitative and quantitative analysis about the impact of company brand, the ownership and 
control structure, and the relationship between the SMEs and their own financial policy. This 
analysis is based on defining the expected relationships that one might consider between the 
referred variables and the total debt ratio. In this regard, the analysis will be conducted by 
means of considering a survey of 410 Spanish SMEs where an ANOVA test will be applied.  
Then, a hierarchical regression model will allow comparison of the hypotheses made.  
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I. Introduction 
The article provides an explanatory analysis of the factors which determine the capital 
structure of the Spanish small and medium enterprises [SMEs], by taking into account the 
different theories based on the asymmetric information that each agent has to face. In 
particular, the following theories will be considered: (i) the ‘agency theory’; (ii) the ‘signals 
theory’ and (iii) the ‘pecking order theory’. 
The decision about the capital structure is one of the most discussed aspects in 
corporate finance, in fact, it is referred to the different categories of fund, equity and debt 
(short and long term), that should be used by the company to fulfil their businesses plan. One 
parameter of particular interest is the leverage ratio, which indicates the proportion of debt vs 
equity (Hall, Hutchinson and Michaelas, 2000). Therefore, the decision about the capital 
structure deals with the best combination of the different financial fund that minimised the 
cost of capital without compromising the business plan. 
There are lots of studies regarding the decisions on capital structure, they all have 
focused on two issues: (i) the determination of the optimal debt ratio that maximizes the 
market value of the firm, and (ii) the determination of the different factors that influence the 
financial decision. 
Indeed, the decision about investment, financing and distribution of dividend must be 
evaluated taking into account the impact that they may have on the business plan that the 
company is intending to achieve, which in particular will be addressed to maximise the 
market value of the company, since all the agents running in the sector will valuate the 
performance by looking at the evolution of this value. 
Therefore, it could be said that the optimal capital structure will be affected by the 
debt policy of the company and any other exogenous parameter that might affect the decision 
of capital structure. Literature has evolved from the ‘thesis of irrelevance’ developed in the 
model of Modigliani and Miller (1958) to the analysis of the tax shield provided by income 
taxes and its impact on corporations (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; De Angelo and Masulis, 
1980) and individuals (Miller, 1977). In addition, the literature has evolved towards the 
financial distress derived from insolvency and bankruptcy risks (Brennan and Schwartz, 1978; 
Chen and Kim, 1979; Bradley, Jarrel and Kim, 1984) as well as the effect of asymmetric 
information and the clash of interests between the agents involved, where can be found the 
theories developed by (i) Jensen and Meckling, (1976), (ii) Ross, (1977); Leland and Pyle, 
(1977), and (iii) Myers, (1984); Myers and Majluf, (1984); Pettit and Singer, (1985). That is 
to say, the agency theory, the signalling approach, and the pecking order theory.  
In recent years, a new theory studying the effects that business strategies have on the 
capital structure decisions has been developed, this theory named the theory of business 
strategies (Robson, Gallagher and Daly, 1994; Jordan, Lowe and Taylor, 1998) is based on 
the influence of the managerial strategies on the financing decisions of the company. This 
influence has two possible approaches: (i) the strategies related to the market where 
companies compete; and (ii) the strategies concerning the production factors, where can be 
highlighted the studies of Brander and Lewis (1986), Barton and Gordon (1988), Chatterjee 
and Wernerfelt (1991), Balakrishnan and Fox (1993), Lowe, Naughton and Taylor (1994) and 
Kochhar and Hitt (1998). 
Although these theoretical approaches deal with capital structure from different 
perspectives, they have in common the interest for ‘large’ corporations (Michaelas, 
Chillenden and Poutziouris, 1999) against any consideration to SMEs, so that, only debt 
patterns in ‘large’ companies are considered, without focusing on the effects on SMEs where 
the application of most of the analytical tools mentioned above is difficult. For instance, one 
of the most important differences between large scale enterprises and SMEs is the difficulty to 
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get long-term funds from the capital markets since no daily and updated information about 
them is available for investors because SMEs in many European countries
1
, do not quote in 
the stock exchange. Because of that, the empirical test for the factors determining the capital 
structure of SMEs has to be based on unquoted firms (Acs and Audretsch, 1990; Chittenden, 
Hall and Hutchinson, 1995; Hull, Hutchinson and Michaelas, 2000; inter alia). Moreover, and 
taking into account that SMEs funds usually come from different sources—credit markets for 
SMEs and capital markets for large companies—it makes more sense to research the decision 
on capital structure within the different groups of SMEs rather than research this decision by 
analysing the differences between SMEs and large companies. 
Credit markets usually are the unique possibility for SMEs to get funds; therefore, 
lending relationships will be critical mechanisms for assessment and control. The existence of 
asymmetric information and different interests between lenders and borrowers lead to ‘credit 
rationing’ (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Therefore, the size of the SMEs, the lack of credit 
ratings or covenants, along with concentration of ownership and control in the entrepreneur’s 
hands, increase the asymmetric information, which results on poorer financial possibilities 
and conditions for SMEs in the credit market (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994, 1995). 
When we look for the key factors that may explain the decision on capital structure, in 
addition to the size, the number of employees, the total assets and the sales revenues, could be 
found certain qualitative variables, such as market reputation, business experience, structure 
and control of the ownership, as well as particular lending relationships that are likely to 
become key issues for the SMEs financing. The capital structure of the SMEs has been 
discussed by Keasey and Watson (1987), Storey, Watson and Wynarczyk (1988), Ang (1991, 
1992), Reid (1993), Storey (1994), Robson, Gallagher and Daly (1994), Jordan, Lowe and 
Taylor (1998), inter alia. In Spain, Maroto (1996), Boedo and Calvo (1997), Aybar, Casino 
and López (2000), inter alia, have published outstanding studies in this field. 
This article discusses the capital structure of SMEs by considering not only 
quantitative variables, but also other qualitative or strategic variables. The paper is structured 
as follows: after this brief introduction are summarized the different theoretical approaches, 
then, the second section analyses the decision on capital structure. The third section, discusses 
the peculiarities of the decision of SMEs regarding their capital structure by looking at what 
the agency theory, pecking order theory and the signalling approach appoints. Section four, 
identifies the variables and hypotheses that should be tested and compared in the empirical 
analysis that will be conducted on section five. Then, section six presents the main 
conclusions from the referred analysis. 
 
II. Theories applied to the decision on capital structure 
 The decision on capital structure consists on identifying the optimal combination of 
debt and equity which maximizes the market value of the firm. Modigliani and Miller’s 
(1958) proved that in perfect markets, the decision on capital structure becomes irrelevant. 
Their study opened the debate and subsequent research on the influence of taxes and 
bankruptcy costs on the capital structure of the company which may explain the current 
borrowing policies (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) by means of the so-called ‘compensation 
theory’. This theory represents a trade-off between the positive and negative effects of the 
financial leverage (Myers, 1984). 
                                                 
1 In Spain, according to the data from European SMEs´ Laboratory, SMEs, represent 99.89% of the companies, 
70 % of the exports and nearly 60% of the imports, etc.  
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A number of other imperfections arising from asymmetric information and clashes of 
interests between the different agents (shareholders, managers and lenders) has to be 
considered too. In this regard, the agency theory was a significant step toward a qualitative 
attempt to explain the decision on capital structure, in difference to previous theoretical 
approaches. The contractual model of the enterprise proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
provided a new theoretical and conceptual framework that permitted the introduction of other 
explanatory factors. Among the many contracts that might define the nature of organizations, 
the agency theory focuses on the financial contracts established between the organization and 
the providers of liabilities, leading to two agency relationships: (i) the ‘managerial 
relationship’ established between shareholders and managers, i.e., between the owners of the 
capital and the management board of the enterprise; and (ii) the ‘borrowing relationship’ 
established between the lenders and the shareholders. The asymmetric information and the 
clashes of interests between the different agents spawn conflict and agency costs. Thus, it 
could be said that every financial structure is characterized by certain agency costs because of 
possible losses that both, shareholders and lenders might suffer from possible opportunistic 
behaviours from managers or owners of capital. These agency costs affect the market value of 
the securities and the company itself; therefore, an optimal capital structure minimizes the 
total agency costs. On the other hand, the agency theory analyses how the borrowing policy 
may reduce the conflicts of agency that may arise between shareholders and managers. On top 
of that, the agency theory also analyses the conflicts that characterize the relationship between 
the shareholders and the fund petitioners in the financial borrowing contracts, which also 
determine the shareholders’ willingness to grant funds, leading to situations of credit rationing 
(Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
The shareholders’ attitude to risk may influence their preferences in the process of 
designing the financial policy of the company. According to the pecking order theory, the 
enterprises organize borrowing from a hierarchical point of view (Myers, 1984; Pettit and 
Singer, 1985), that is to say, the management board has a greater preference for internal funds 
rather than for external funds, which are only available when there are opportunities of 
profitable investment, or when self-financing is insufficient. In that case, the management 
board prefers borrowing, and only uses share issues as a last resort; in this way, they avoid 
sharing the business opportunities with entrants, since this transmits negative information to 
the market (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). This hierarchical order is of particular 
interest for the SMEs because of the high costs of external financing that must be accounted 
for (Pettit and Singer, 1985; Ang, 1991; Cosh and Hughes, 1994; Holmes and Kent, 1991), 
and according to Myers (1984), the main consequence of the asymmetric information which 
exists in the credit market (Michaelas et al., 1999). 
The signalling approach establishes propositions about the sense and intensity of the 
response of the market value of the assets in case of changes in the capital structure. The idea 
behind this approach is that the market acts as a supervisor and controller of the managerial 
function, at the same time, it assesses the financial decisions of the company as an indicator or 
a signal about the expected cash-flows and solvency of those companies (Ross, 1977; Leland 
and Pyle, 1977). 
 
III. The decision on the capital structure within the context of the SMEs 
 ‘Large companies’ have been the reference for corporate finance. This type of 
companies are mainly characterized by: (i) the separation and specialization of ownership and 
control; (ii) the dispersal of the ownership among a considerable number of shareholders; (iii) 
the usage of markets of shares and bonds as a way to get funds; and (iv) the role of the capital 
markets as a mechanism of assessment and control. Therefore, these assessments and control 
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by means of the market quotations becomes the departing point for the analysis of the 
financial decisions of the company, in particular for those decisions related to the capital 
structure. However, it looks reasonable to analyse the capital structure of SMEs in this 
theoretical framework.  
The literature about the analysis of the financial decisions has traditionally stressed the 
importance of quantitative variables related to the volume of assets, business turnover or 
number of workers. Nevertheless, and in addition to these quantitative variables recent 
research has highlighted the importance of qualitative factors.  
The limitations found by the SMEs when are intending to have access to the capital 
markets, the markets of assets and bonds and the fact of not negotiating their own assets in a 
secondary organized market, provokes the absence of a reasonable mechanism of assessment 
and control for this type of companies.  
In fact, since the SMEs are not publicly traded, it is not feasible to analyse decisions 
related to capital structure by considering their effect on the financial objective of maximizing 
the market value of the company. The financial dependency of the small companies from the 
bank credit market leads to consider the lending relationship as the best reference to analyse 
the capital structure. Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) prove that the debt ratio decreases with 
the age of the company and it increases with the size. Therefore, those companies which are 
younger are expected to turn to finance companies with third-party resources, whereas mature 
or established companies are self-financed (Berger and Udell, 1992, 1995; inter alia). 
The concentration of ownership and control of the SMEs may have important 
consequences on their financing decisions. The lack of specialization and the overlap between 
the roles of the entrepreneur and the owner leads to a lack of delegation of authority. 
Therefore, the decision-making is concentrated in a single person, which provokes 
opportunistic behaviours by the owner-manager who, in turn, has a major part of his/her 
personal and family wealth invested in the company. Moreover, owners have unlimited 
responsibility. Thus, if there exists a lack of specialization, there will be a clear identification 
of the entrepreneur figure (owner-manager) with the company in such a way that the 
development of the SMEs will be closely linked to the entrepreneur’s life. 
These circumstances increase the level of asymmetric information and clash of 
interests that exist between the different agents involved in the borrowing contracts. The 
agency approach, the hypotheses based on the theory of signals, and the pecking order 
theory, are the bases for analysing the capital structure in the case of SMEs. 
 
IV. Variables and relationships to be considered in the model 
 Grounding on the rules established by the agency theory, the pecking order theory and 
the signalling approach, and considering the unique characteristics of the SMEs, the factors 
determining the capital structure have been grouped in two blocks: (i) quantitative variables 
related to ‘size’; and (ii) three qualitative variables related to the ‘reputation’ of the enterprise, 
the structure of ‘ownership and control’, and the ‘lending relationship’. This article defines 
the capital structure of the firm as a function of the debt ratio; i.e.: the relationship between 
the debt (short- and long-term) and the total resources. 
 
A. Size  
The size of the company allows the lenders to calculate their own market power and, 
indirectly estimate the risk of insolvency. The greater the volume of assets, profits, sales or 
employees, the greater the capacity of self-financing and the probability of diversify correctly 
so that, the solvency and the capacity to pay interest will increase as well. The size is, related 
to other group of variables that determine the capital structure of the company. Thus, large 
companies present higher levels of investment, because they have a greater capacity to offer 
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covenants to the lender. On the other hand, if economies of scale related to the acquisition of 
new information are considered, then it will be proportionally more expensive for lenders to 
supervise a SME than a ‘large’ enterprise. Furthermore, SMEs usually find harder to fulfil the 
information requirements established in the financial markets. Finally, the size of the 
company has been one of the factors which explain the structure and concentration of 
ownership.  
The larger the company, the greater the separation between ownership and control, 
and the dispersion of the capital. The possibility that the board shows opportunistic 
behaviours against the interests of external shareholders explains the frequent usage of 
borrowing as an external mechanism to control the managerial function. According to the 
agency theory and the signals approach, a positive relationship between the size and the level 
of borrowing in the enterprise should be expected. However, from the point of view of the 
pecking order theory, the larger the volume of fixed assets, the larger the sinking funds and, 
hence, the bigger the self-financing. Therefore, there is a negative relationship with the debt 
ratio. 
 
H.1.a: Size—measured by the number of employees, volume of sales and 
volume of assets—will be positively related to the debt ratio (agency 
theory and signals approach). 
H.1.b: Size—measured by the number of employees, volume of sales and 
volume of assets—will be negative related to the debt ratio (pecking 
order theory). 
 
B. Reputation of the company 
One of the factors that may reduce the agency costs of borrowing (especially those 
originating from over-investment), is the ‘reputation of the company’ (Diamond, 1989; John 
and Natchman, 1985). Diamond (1989) suggests that the ‘reputation of the company’ may be 
measured as a function of variables such as the age of the company. The reputation is 
reflected by the availability to obtain the required finance. The observation that capital 
markets does of the SMEs satisfying the contractual obligations over a long period of time is 
one of the most valuable intangible assets of these companies since the credit market 
accumulates this information. The ‘reputation’ is related to the capacity of the company to 
tackle the commitment of payments, i.e., the repayment of the principal and interest
2
. The 
managers’ willingness to preserve these intangible assets discourages opportunistic decision-
making and high-risk investments are rejected in favour of more secure projects, thereby 
diminishing the agency costs of the borrowing derived from decisions leading to over-
investment. Consequently, according to the agency theory and the signals approach, the 
longer the service the greater the reputation in the credit market. Then, the greater will be the 
possibilities to get funds. 
                                                 
2 The SMEs enter the credit market with low-quality and insufficient information, which increases the 
information asymmetries that already exist, although, in Norton’s opinion (1991), these information differences 
depend on the ‘stage or life cycle’ that the enterprise is going through. During the growing stage of the SME, the 
financial markets have little or no information about it. It is for this reasons that self-financing and very short-
term borrowing prevail as sources of fund-raising. During the development stage, the SMEs steadily consolidate 
their position in both markets and the success or the failure of their projects, as well as the fulfilment of their 
financial compromises, permit the development of relationships with the financial companies that may facilitate 
their access to the credit market with more favourable conditions, and so establish capital structures based on 
long-term borrowing. Once in their  maturity stage, SMEs have access to the capital market and it is during this 
period that bonds are issued, projects are developed by means of financial mediators (e.g., Loan Guarantee 
Association or Capital Venture Enterprises), and the growth in capital is more important as a source of finance.   
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The ‘reputation’ may also be measured as a function of the number of years that the 
company has been owned by the entrepreneur. The low specialization that generally exists in 
these companies with respect to the ownership and control, and the owner-managers’ 
reluctance to delegate responsibilities, creates a greater dependency that SMEs have on the 
owner-manager. When this person leaves the position —due to death, illness, retirement, job 
turnover, etc.—problems of succession may arise provoking the lost of credibility and 
reputation and leading to the demise of the company. Consequently, changes of ownership are 
similar to create and set up a new company, which provokes the asymmetric information and 
the risk perceived by the lender (Boedo and Calvo, 1997). When the age of the company is 
analysed in terms of the development cycle, the youngest and the most dynamic companies 
tend to use their own resources intensely, as well as the bank debt and commercial short-term 
debt, to face the problems of liquidity (Weston and Brigham, 1981). Because of the difficulty 
to obtain permanent funds (borrowed and own capital), these companies survive they match 
the growth rate to their own capacity of self-financing. Therefore, the age will be negatively 
associated, in general, with the short-term debt and positively associated with the long-term 
debt. Consequently, the youngest companies are expected to have lower levels of debt. 
Therefore, a positive relationship is expected to occur between the numbers of years that the 
companies belong to the existing owner, and the level of borrowing. 
On the other hand, there is a direct relationship between the age and the size of the 
companies. In general, as time goes by and the company increases in experience and position 
within the market, new strategies for growth based on increasing the investment in assets and 
human resources (employment) might appear. These strategies increase sales and revenues as 
well as self-financing possibilities (Norton, 1991). According to the pecking order theory, 
when companies have more internal funds, they prefer to use them, and they will borrow only 
when self-financing is insufficient. Therefore, following this theory, there is a negative 
relationship between reputation and debt ratio. 
 
H.2.a: Reputationmeasured by the number of years that the company has 
been providing services and the numbers of years belonging to the 
current owner will be positively related to the debt ratio (agency 
theory and signals approach). 
H.2.b: Reputationmeasured by the number of years that the company has 
been providing services and the number of years belonging to the 
current owner will be negatively related to the debt ratio (pecking 
order theory). 
 
C. Ownership structure.  
The relationship between the SMEs and the lenders is, characterized by the structure 
of ownership and control in the company. Two major types of SMEs can be distinguished: (i) 
those where the manager is the owner of the entire capital; and (ii) the medium-sized family 
companies where the functions of ownership and management are separated. Two important 
groups of interest can be identified: (a) the owner-managers; and (b) the external owners that 
do not sit on the management board (Ang, 1991, 1992). 
If capital and control are in hands of a few agents and the clash of interests between 
managers and shareholders is low, the usage of borrowing as a mechanism for supervising 
and controlling managerial functions might not be necessary because lenders deal with fewer 
agents (e.g., owner-directors). Under this scenario the asymmetric information is reduced and 
the agents are more controlled. Thus, according to the agency theory, a positive relationship 
between the specialization level and the separation of functions in the ownership and control 
and the debt ratio exists. Nevertheless, the pecking order theory points out that, when no 
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separation exists the owner-manager has to invest a major part of his/her personal wealth and 
there is no potential for using retained earnings, SMEs tend to prefer borrowing to avoid 
involving outsiders and lose the control of the decision-making. 
 
H.3.a: The specialization and separation of the ownership and control 
functions are positively related to the debt ratio (agency theory and 
signals approach). 
H.3.b: The specialization and separation of the ownership and control 
functions are negatively related to the debt  ratio (pecking order 
theory). 
 
D. Characteristics of the lending relationship  
The possibilities of raising funds in the credit market may also be determined by the 
features characterizing the relationship between the lender and the borrower (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994). Three explanatory variables have been considered in this respect: (i) the age of 
the relationship with the main financial company; (ii) the number of financial companies; and 
(iii) the existence of covenants, as well as their nature. 
The experience of past relationships along with the information that the lender has 
about the borrower cuts the analysis of costs. Conversely, in the case of new applicants for 
funds, lenders may have the information provided by the SMEs themselves or the information 
obtained from external sources, such as other lenders or rating agencies. For these reasons, the 
asymmetric information depends on the age of the lending relationship in such a way that 
those companies that maintain a long-standing relationship are expected to get credits more 
easily. The theory suggests that those companies with a closer association to financial 
companies usually have lower costs of capital and greater availability of funds. Consequently, 
according to the rules of the agency theory and the signals approach, a positive relationship is 
expected to find between the duration of the lending relationship and the level of borrowing. 
 
H.4.a: The length of the lending relationship is directly related to the debt 
ratio. 
 
The availability to get credits might be determined by the number of financial 
companies that the borrower maintains a relationship with. The greater the number of 
financial entities dealing with the borrower, the smaller the availability to get credits and the 
greater the price (interest) paid for that credit, as Petersen and Rajan (1994) proved. 
 
H.4.b: The number of financial companies dealing with the SMEs is 
inversely related to the debt ratio. 
 
The covenants that the owner-manager decides to provide, and their nature, may be a 
signal about the future earnings that the entrepreneur-owner expects from the investment 
undertaken (Stiglitz, 1987). The cost of losing these assets in bankruptcy is the enticement 
that asserts the validity of that signal and transmits positive information to the lenders about 
the borrowing capacity of the company. From the point of view of the borrowing decision, 
more funds will be available to the entrepreneur willing to provide more covenants with a 
personal nature, or related to assets that do not belong to the company. The signal is greater 
when the covenants are personal or real, or when they are related to assets that do not belong 
to the business activity. Therefore, according to the agency theory and the signal approach, 
there is a positive relationship between the existence of those covenants and the debt ratio. 
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H.4.c.: The existence of covenants in the borrowing contracts by the SMEs  is directly 
related to the debt ratio. 
 
As was stated above, the objective of this study is to make an exploratory analysis on 
the nature of the factors determining the capital structure in the case of SMEs. The debt ratio 
has been considered as a representative and dependent variable of the capital structure. In this 
regard, the debt ratio is defined as the relation between the total debt—short- and long-term—
and the total resources. Explanatory variables might be grouped in four blocks. 
 
 Block 1: related to size; three variables are considered: (i) SIZE1 related to the number of 
employees; (ii) SIZE2 related to the volume of sales; and (iii) SIZE3 related to the total 
value of the net assets. 
 Block 2: comprises the variables of the company reputation. Two variables are 
considered: (i) AGE1 related to the age of the company; and (ii) AGE2 related to the 
number of years that the company belongs to the current owner. 
 Block 3: related to the structure of ownership and control; variable DIR is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if a non-owner manages the enterprise. 
 Block 4: comprises the variables defining the lending relationship; five variables  included 
in this group: (i) NFC: number of financial companies with which the company maintains 
a relationship; (ii) AR: measures the age of the relationship with the main financial 
company, and (iii) PERC, REALCUNR and REALCR, which measure, respectively, 
whether the company provides covenants of a personal or real nature, related or unrelated 
to the activity of the enterprise, and owned or not owned by the company. 
 
In addition, the model includes the main activities of the SMEs as a control variable. 
The variables named after the abbreviations INDSEC, COMSEC, CONSEC and SERSEC, 
serve to identify whether the enterprise belongs to industry, commerce, construction or 
services, respectively. 
 
V. Empirical analysis 
 A. Data and methodology 
The relationships outlined in the model are compared by means of an empirical analysis with 
a sample of 13,200 SMEs of the ‘Spanish Guide of Exporting Enterprises’. The study was 
conducted by an email questionnaire sent during the period November 1999 to January 2000. 
410 companies correctly answer to the questionnaire, which represent 3,1%
3
 of the companies 
surveyed. 
To clarify the relationships, which are established between the independent variables 
and the TBR, the survey has been divided into four groups according to the values that the 
ratio may have. Group I comprises those companies with low levels of borrowing, and debt 
ratio inferior to 25%. Group 2 includes companies with debt ratios between 25% and 50%. 
Group 3 are companies with debt ratios between 50 and 75%, and Group 4 represents those 
companies with debt ratios above 75%. 
                                                 
3 The use of email questionnaires is worthy of further discussion as this method is likely to become of increasing 
importance in the future. However, the reasons for and implications of using this approach are not discussed. 
Some of the advantages of using email questionnaires are: (i) the speed; (ii) the saving in time and money; and 
(iii) their greater impact. Some of the disadvantages are: (i) the questionnaire fails if the interviewee requires help 
to respond, (ii) there is no anonymity, which may be an important consideration when answering, and (iii) the 
limited installation of the Internet in Spain (the penultimate one among EU countries, before Greece, Nielsen 
Netratings, July, 2001), mainly in small and medium-sized companies.  
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The existence of significant differences between the groups is analysed by considering 
the independent variables by means of an ANOVA. Table I describes the statistical features of 
the sample and the company groups considered as well as the results of the ANOVA. 
Significant differences can be observed with respect to the following variables: (i) number of 
employees; (ii) volume of total net assets; (iii) number of financial companies that the 
enterprise maintains a relationship with; (iv) age of the relationship with the main financial 
company; and (v) existence of real covenants unrelated to the business. 
Finally, and in order to contrast the hypotheses established in the theoretical part, and 
to analyse the combined effect of the explanatory variables on the debt ratio, a model of 
hierarchical regression was developed, consisting of the introduction of groups of variables 
corresponding to the four blocks considered into the regression equation, size, reputation, 
structure of ownership and control, and characteristics of the lending relationship. 
 
 B. Results 
 The companies in the survey have an average of 35 employees, an average volume of 
sales of €4.27 million and average net assets of €2.09 million. The companies with less 
borrowing (Group 1) are generally smaller enterprises, in terms of number of employees and 
business turnover, however, larger companies have debt ratios of 25% to 50%. Although the 
differences are statistically significant for the number of employees and volume of assets, the 
analysis of the data does not seem to confirm the relationships that might be expected in 
theory; that is to say, fulfilment of H.1.a, the larger the size of the company, the higher the 
debt ratio. However, since H.1.b is satisfied, the results are not contradictory with those 
obtained in the studies of Peterson and Schulman (1987); Holmes and Kent, (1991). 
Therefore, large companies usually have higher capitalization rates and, consequently, lower 
levels of borrowing as the pecking order theory predicts. 
With respect to the ‘main activity within the sector’, 39% of the companies belong to 
the sector of services, 29% of them to the industry sector and 22% to the sector of commerce. 
Although there are no significant differences between groups, except in the case of the 
construction sector, companies with high levels of borrowing belong to the industry sector, 
whereas those other companies with low levels of borrowing belong to the sector of services. 
With respect to the ‘reputation of the company, measured by the age of the firm 
(AGE1), the companies included in the survey have an average age of 20 years. In particular 
the companies which belong to Group 1, are characterised by the lowest levels of borrowing, 
at the same time, those companies which belong to Group 4, have the highest levels of 
borrowing and are the youngest companies of the sample. The companies which belong to 
Group 2, with a debt ratio between 25% and 50%, are the most long-standing and experienced 
companies. Therefore, AGE1 is statistically significant for all the groups, and the analysis of 
the data does not confirm the theoretical relationship established by the agency theory and 
signalling theory, H.2.a; however, it confirms the relationship established by the pecking 
order theory, H.2.b. Concerning the variable AGE2, the number of years being the current 
owner provides similar results. 
With respect to the ‘structure of ownership and control’ of the companies included in 
the survey, non-owners manage only 11,48% of the companies. As might be expected in 
SMEs companies, generally there is no clear separation of functions since the ownership and 
control of the company is at the owner’s hands. However, no sign of significant differences 
between the different categories of groups can be observed. In this regard, from the analysis 
of the data no confirmation of any relationship between the agency theory and the signals 
approach; therefore H.3.a is not fulfilled. However, this relationship can be confirmed under 
the pecking order theory, H.3.b. 
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From the main characteristics that define the lending relationship point of view, can be 
highlighted that there are four financial companies associated to the companies included in the 
survey. Moreover, the ANOVA reveals some statistically significant differences between the 
groups studied. On average, companies with the lowest borrowing level (Group 1) deal with 
three companies, whereas those with the highest borrowing level (Group 4) deal with five; 
therefore, those companies with higher borrowing, on average, deal with more companies. 
However, the sense of H.4.b in the relationship between this variable and the debt ratio cannot 
be confirmed. 
This result, which is the opposite of Peterson and Rajan’s (1994), is a consequence of 
the characteristics of the Spanish credit market, which is highly specialized and very 
fragmented. Indeed, the Savings Banks of the Comunidades Autónomas are the main lenders 
to SMEs. 
Concerning the ‘age of the relationship with the main financial company’, the age of 
the relationship for the groups under survey is only 3,77 years, which is rather recent in 
comparison to the average age of the companies included in the survey (20.47 years). This 
may indicate, the existence of great competition in the current credit market, so that many 
entrepreneurs frequently change companies. In a similar way, some statistically significant 
differences are noticed between groups. The age of the relationship is generally smaller for 
those companies with the lowest levels of borrowing, which indeed confirms H4.a. 
The descriptive analysis can be concluded by doing a reference to the importance of 
covenants, as well as to their nature, although it must be remarked that the number of 
responses and cases surveyed in relation to these variables is considerably lower—273 cases. 
Out of these cases, 20% have covenants of a personal or real type unrelated to the business, 
and 18% have real covenants related to the activity. The percentages become larger in those 
companies where the debt ratio is greater, which confirms H.4.c at the 10% significance level; 
however, it is only in cases of real covenants unrelated to the business where the differences 
between groups are statistically significant. 
A model of hierarchical regression has been proposed across-the-board to compare the 
referred hypotheses. Before doing so, the array of correlations between the variables had to be 
computed, and was observed a high correlation between the variables SIZE1, SIZE2 and 
SIZE3. For this reason, the variable corresponding to the Napier’s logarithm of the volume of 
total net assets was introduced in the regression model as an explanatory variable for size  
In the first step, the variable LSIZE3 and those variables of control related to sectors 
of main activity were included; resulting that only the volume of assets is statistically 
significant. Thus, the relationship established at H.1.a is confirmed, that is to say, the larger 
the volume of assets, the larger the debt ratio. 
In the second step, the variables related to the reputation of the enterprise, AGE1 and 
AGE2 were added to the previous variables. In this case, the variable size related to the 
volume of assets still is statistically significant, which does not confirm the hypothesis related 
to the variable ‘reputation’. However, with respect to the variable AGE1, the relationship is 
negative as suggested by the pecking order theory. 
In a third step, the variable DIR related to the structure of ownership and control was 
added to the previous variables. In this case, the variable volume of assets results statistically 
significant. Therefore, the sense of the relationship is the one observed according to the 
pecking order theory, even though it is not statistically significant. 
In the fourth step, two more variables related to the characteristics of the lending 
relationship were added to the previous variables; NFC (number of financial companies) and 
AR (age of the relationship). In this case, the variable related to the size of the company 
becomes statistically insignificant, whereas the ‘number of financial companies’ is significant. 
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In the array of correlations, both variables are correlated in such a way that companies with 
larger size usually deal with more financial companies; this fact favours their access to the 
credit market. In this sense, the hypothesis established in the theoretical model may be 
confirmed. Concerning variable AR, the sense of the relationship is the opposite. 
Consequently, the ‘age of the relationship with the main financial company’ is not an 
explanatory factor of the capital structure. This is because of the features of the credit market, 
which is very competitive and, thus, the change of company becomes a normal practice 
among the enterprises. Petersen and Rajan (1994) found contrary results. 
As can be seen the negative and positive signs depend on the sense of the relationship: 
positive, indicates a direct relationship; and negative indicates an inverse relationship between 
the dependent and independent variable. 
Finally, in the fifth step, the variables related to the covenants are added to the 
previous ones. In the model of total regression where all the factors are included, the 
statistically significant variables that are explanatory of the debt ratio are the number of 
financial companies (NFC) and the existence of personal covenants (PERC). Both factors are 
positively related to the debt ratio, which confirms the hypotheses established in the 
theoretical model. 
 
VI.  Summary and concluding remarks 
Although the low response level obtained in the survey could limit the interpretation 
of the results, we consider that this research provides interesting ideas about the decision of 
capital structure for SMEs. 
Therefore, this study provides an explanatory analysis of the nature of the factors 
which determine the capital structure of SMEs. The distinctive features of this type of 
companies are: (i) the impossibility of using equity markets and, therefore, the absence of 
objective mechanisms of assessment; (ii) the dependence of this type of companies from the 
bank credit market; and (iii) the presence of a structure of ownership and control that is 
characterized by no separating both functions. 
All these circumstances have two important consequences. On one hand, the degree of 
asymmetric information among the different agents involved in the market is increased; the 
agency theory, the pecking order theory and the signals approach theory are the optimal 
conceptual referential frameworks for studying the decisions related to the capital structure in 
the case of SMEs. On the other hand, a reconsideration of the analysis is required; the 
relationship LR in the credit market is the ideal referential framework or unit of analysis. 
In the specific case of SMEs and in addition to the importance of quantitative 
variables related to size, other qualitative variables related to reputation, structure of 
ownership and control, and characteristics of the lending relationship, seem to be relevant 
factors to take into account in the analysis of the decisions about capital structure. 
 
 Size of the enterprise: even though the differences are statistically significant for the 
number of employees and volume of assets, the analysis of the data does not confirm the 
relationships that might be expected according to the agency theory and the signals 
approach, the larger the size, the higher the debt ratio. Although it confirms the 
relationships from the pecking order theory, the size will be negatively related to the debt 
ratio. Indeed, the negative relationship between the level of debt and the size coincides 
with the pecking order theory, but is opposite to that expected from the agency theory and 
the signal approach, so that bigger companies with greater levels of self-financing will 
have lower debt requirements. 
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 Reputation of the company (age): with respect to the variable (AGE1), although the 
differences are statistically significant between groups for this variable, the analysis of the 
data does not confirm the relationship that might be expected according to the agency 
theory or to the signal approach (H.2.a). However, it does confirm the relationship 
between the variables according to the pecking order theory (H.2.b). With respect to 
variable AGE2 (years in possession of the current owner), the results are similar; that is, 
H.2 would not be fulfilled. The difficulties of testing the variable ‘reputation’ come from 
the unit used in the quantification, age of the company as measured by the number of 
years since the company commenced. Other empirical works, such as Boedo y Calvo 
(1997), suggest that the age of the company is, among others, a component of reputation, 
which integrates many qualitative and quantitative aspects. In any case, age, as the 
empirical results suggest, may be negatively related to the level of debt. Therefore, those 
companies that are just starting usually incur losses or low profit levels, because their 
self-financing possibilities are constrained, which makes debt the best way to obtain 
funds in the short term. As these companies continue in the marketplace and gain the 
experience needed to survive, their performance will improve and they will require less 
debt. 
 
 Structure of ownership and control: those enterprises with higher level of specialization in 
the functions have a lower level of borrowing. It may be confirmed that the direction of 
the relationship is negative, in the same way as the pecking order theory suggests, even 
though it is not statistically significant in the regression model. The results suggest that 
smaller companies are usually managed by one director, who owns the main proportion 
of capital, and thus avoids the entrance of another agent. As the pecking order theory 
suggests, in those cases where self-financing is not sufficient, debt is preferred to the 
issuing of shares because the entrance of new owners is supposed to diminish the control 
of the director. 
 
 Characteristics of the ‘lending relationship’: the results obtained in the regression confirm 
the existence of relationships for the number of entities and the availability of personal 
guarantees. As has been argued, the credit market is the main point of reference for 
obtaining funds, especially for Spanish SMEs. The literature suggests that the stronger the 
relationship between the financial entity and the company, the lower the constraints to 
obtain funds. However, the results achieved predict a negative relationship between the 
debt ratio and the age of the relationship with the financial entity. Although this result is 
not unexpected when we observe the level of competence and fragmentation of the 
current credit market. The low interest rates and the appearance of new financial entities 
have increased the level of competition in the market. Nowadays, the relationship with 
the financial entity is not such an important factor because of the facilities to change the 
financial institution. Companies usually work with more financial entities, and establish 
specialized relationships depending on the financial services. In any case, the results point 
out that the availability of guarantees is a key factor to obtain funds from the credit 
market. At the same time, the availability of guarantees reduces the asymmetric 
information and the uncertainty in the relationship between the borrower and lender. 
Furthermore, the guarantees reduce the possibility of losses for the lender in case of 
insolvency. Finally, the guarantees can be seen as a positive signal to the lender because it 
indicates that insolvency is unlikely; therefore, entrepreneurs who are able to offer more 
guarantees will have lower constraints to get funds from the credit market. In 20% of the 
cases in our survey, the companies have covenants of a personal or real type not related to 
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the business, and 18% have real covenants related to the activity. Between groups, the 
percentages are higher for those companies that have a higher debt ratio, which confirms 
H.4.c, even though it is only the differences between groups for the case of the real 
covenants not related to the business that are statistically significant. 
 
Although the analysis of the regression does not provide empirical evidence of the 
impact of the variables on the capital structure of SMEs, the research allows us to conclude 
that the pecking order theory is a more useful instrument for explaining the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables, age, size, property structure and control. 
As the results point out, there is evidence that the pecking order theory is an acceptable 
approach to be applied to SMEs. The self-financing possibilities and maintenance of the 
control are two explanatory factors of the capital structure of SMEs, as well as the impact of 
the availability guarantees on the relationship between the borrower and the lender. 
The results of the study are in line with the latest research, which, owing to the low 
number of studies and the rather inconclusive results generally obtained, is still in its initial 
phases. 
In spite of the difficulties of studying the financial decisions within the specific field 
of SMEs, we believe that it would be useful in the future to: (i) continue studying in more 
detail the demand factors, that is, the internal variables of the enterprise that determine these 
types of decisions; and (ii) incorporate into these studies an analysis of the supply factors that 
are related to the characteristics of the financial markets. 
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Table I 
 
Main features of each group and the ANOVA 
 
  
No. 
Cases 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum F(ANOVA) 
SIZE1 
(Number of employees) 
 
 
 
  
Group 1 74 19.57 25.69 1 130 
0.025 
Group 2 58 53.08 82.58 2 240 
Group 3 114 36.32 50.47 1 239 
Group 4 146 34.21 43.12 1 226 
Global 392 34.85 42.97 1 240 
SIZE2 
(Volume of sales) 
 
  
 
  
Group 1 71 592.44 1679.8 2 10228 
 
Group 2 58 1117.33 2946.27 8 21000 
Group 3 112 671.95 1069.45 1 6254 
Group 4 138 629.44 1228.73 0 8629 
Global 379 709.73 1656.93 0 21000 
SIZE3 
(Volume of net total assets)  
  
  
Group 1 44 545.29 1595.82 0 10096 
0.035 
Group 2 46 911.29 1466.75 2 6300 
Group 3 84 479.22 811.97 1 4149 
Group 4 100 346.89 746.16 1 6315 
Global 274 514.07 1093.36 0 10096 
INDSEC 
(Industry activity sector) 
 
  
  
Group 1 75 0.2267 0.4215 0 1 
 
Group 2 58 0.3621 0.4848 0 1 
Group 3 112 0.2857 0.4538 0 1 
Group 4 146 0.3014 0.4604 0 1 
Global 391 0.2916 0.4551 0 1 
COMSEC 
(Commerce sector) 
 
  
  
Group 1 75 0.1733 0.3811 0 1 
 
Group 2 58 0.2414 0.4317 0 1 
Group 3 112 0.2411 0.4297 0 1 
Group 4 146 0.2123 0.4104 0 1 
Global 391 0.2174 0.413 0 1 
CONSEC 
(Construction sector) 
 
  
  
Group 1 75 0.00533 0.2262 0 1 
0.093 
Group 2 58 0.0017 0.1313 0 1 
Group 3 112 0.1161 0.3218 0 1 
Group 4 146 0.1027 0.3047 0 1 
Global 391 0.00844 0.2783 0 1 
SERSEC 
(Services sector) 
 
  
  
Group 1 75 0.5333 0.5022 0 1 
 
Group 2 58 0.3793 0.4895 0 1 
Group 3 112 0.3125 0.4656 0 1 
Group 4 146 0.3699 0.4844 0 1 
Global 391 0.3862 0.4875 0 1 
AGE1 
(Years since the commercial activity 
began) 
 
  
Group 1 76 18.5 19.08 1 84 
0.018 
Group 2 58 27.28 29.01 1 140 
Group 3 114 21.86 20.74 1 107 
Group 4 145 17.69 16.75 1 100 
Global 393 20.47 20.74 1 140 
 
AGE2 
(Years in possession of the current 
owner) 
  
  
 
  
Group 1 77 15.43 15.32 1 84 
 
Group 2 57 18.72 22.95 1 140 
Group 3 110 19.21 21.64 1 140 
Group 4 144 14.38 12.83 1 80 
Global 388 16.59 17.88 1 140 
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Table I, continued 
 
Main features of each group and the ANOVA 
 
DIR 
(Managed by a non-owner) 
 
  
Group 1 77 0.1169 0.3234 0 1 
 
Group 2 58 0.1379 0.3478 0 1 
Group 3 114 0.1316 0.3395 0 1 
Group 4 143 0.0090 0.2885 0 1 
Global 392 0.1148 0.3192 0 1 
NFC 
(Number of finance companies) 
  
  
  
Group 1 75 3.32 2.72 0 16 
0.033 
Group 2 58 3.93 3.96 0 30 
Group 3 115 4.5 2.8 1 17 
Group 4 147 4.47 3.01 0 15 
Global 395 4.18 3.08 0 30 
AR 
(Age of the relationship with the main finance company) 
  
  
  
Group 1 49 3.2 1.44 1 5  
<0.001 
 
Group 2 51 4.2 1.91 1 15 
Group 3 113 4.04 1.39 1 13 
Group 4 134 3.59 1.22 1 5 
Global 347 3.77 1.45 1 15 
PERC 
(Personal covenants) 
 
  
  
Group 1 44 0.14 0.35 0 1 
 
Group 2 32 0.19 0.4 0 1 
Group 3 85 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Group 4 112 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Global 273 0.2 0.4 0 1 
REALCUNR 
(Real covenants unrelated to the business activity) 
  
  
  
Group 1 42 0.12 0.33 0 1 
0.083 
Group 2 32 0.0093 0.3 0 1 
Group 3 85 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Group 4 112 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Global 271 0.2 0.4 0 1 
REALCR 
(Real covenants related to the business activity) 
  
  
  
Group 1 44 0.11 0.32 0 1 
 
Group 2 31 0.0096 0.3 0 1 
Group 3 84 0.19 0.4 0 1 
Group 4 112 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Global 271 0.18 0.39 0 1 
NOTE: 
Group 1: Comprises those enterprises with low borrowing levels, which have total debt ratios of 
less than or equal to 25%.  
Group 2: Includes enterprises with total debt ratios between 25% and 50%.  
Group 3: Consists of enterprises with total debt ratios between 50% and 75%. 
Group 4: Represents those enterprises with total debt ratios above 75%. 
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Table II 
 
Hierarchical regression model 
 
VARIABLES Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
(Constant) 41.441 46.788 44.432 27.692 35.662 
LSIZE3 
(Volume of net total assets) 
12.486** 13.495** 14.018** –0.576 –3.046 
INDSEC 
(Industry activity sector) 
–39.441 –40.997 –38.782 –38.379 –45.166 
COMSEC 
(Commerce sector) 
–30.644 –32.402 –31.198 –32.385 –32.527 
CONSEC 
(Construction sector) 
–17.224 –20,597 –21.367 –12.070 –11.336 
SERSEC 
(Services sector) 
4.456 .562 2.926 29.200 30.504 
AGE1 
(Years since the main activity began) 
 –0.664 –0.573 –0.128 –0.412 
AGE2 
(Years in possession of the current 
owner) 
 0.371 0.296 –0.438 –0.294 
DIR 
(Managed by a non-owner) 
  –31.106 –32.674 –21.925 
NFC 
(Number of finance companies) 
   24.519**
* 
24.119**
* 
AR 
(Age of the relationship with the main 
finance company) 
   –7.130 –9.241 
PERC 
(PERSONAL covenants) 
    69.242* 
REALCUNR 
(REAL covenants unrelated to the 
business activity) 
    33.325 
REALCR 
(REAL covenants related to the 
business activity) 
    –24.400 
Dependent variable: total debt (TBR) 
 *     Significant at 5%  
 **   Significant at 2%  
 *** Significant at 1%  
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Figure 1  
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